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MODERN THIRD-PARTY PRACTICESUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL?
ROBERT LEE KOERNER

area within which a person charged with negligence is permitted to pass liability on to another allegedly negligent party is closely
circumscribed in New York, both by statutory and by decisional law.
It encompasses a group of special situations and relationships where
it has seemed reasonable to impose an ultimate responsibility upon a
party who has played an active role in a negligent situation in favor
of one who is made answerable to the injured person, but whose part
in the event is merely passive, or arises from the sanction of public
policy, contract, or status.'
THE

I.

THE PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF IMPLEADER

THE theory of indemnification over by the primary tort-feasor
against another held equally liable to an injured third person is
still in evolution, however, as the cases sometimes involve narrow distinctions which rest upon the precise facts.2 This, notwithstanding a
decade of adjudicative experience with Section 193-a of the Civil Practice Act, which embodies the general objective of making impleader
practice in New York more liberal and definitive, and of removing the
more drastic limitations of the older provision regarding impleader
procedure under the superseded Section 193, subdivision 3 of the Civil
Practice Act which was found on the statute books prior to 1946.1
ROBERT LEE KOERNER is a member of the New York Bar and Bene Merenti Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Business Administration.
1 Anderson v. Liberty Fast Freight Company, Inc., 285 App. Div. 44, 135 N. Y. S.
2d 559 (3rd Dep't 1954).
The rules by which the relative delinquencies of joint tort-feasors are appraised
would seem to represent the outpost judicial approach in New York to the doctrine
of comparative negligence. See, Meltzer v. Temple Estates, Inc., 203 Misc. 602, 116
N. Y. S. 2d 546 (City Ct. N. Y. 1952).
2 Harrington v. 615 West Corp., et al., 1 App. Div. 2d 435, 151 N. Y. S. 2d 564
(1st Dep't 1956).
The legalistic demarcation, however, between the "active-passive" duality and
the doctrine of contributory negligence is very narrow. See, Opper v. Tripp Lake
Estates, Inc., 300 N. Y. 572, 89 N. E. 2d 527 (1949).
3 Fortune v. City of Syracuse, 191 Misc. 738, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 775 (Sup. Ct.
Onondaga Co. 1948).
The development of the concept may be traced to the case of City of Brooklyn
v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 475, 487, 7 Am. R. 469 (1882), where the court
stated, "Where the parties are not equally criminal, the principal delinquent may be
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Hence, despite the fact that under the present New York law impleader is no longer limited to cases where the claim of the defendant
against a third party is identical to, or emanates from, the claim which
is asserted in the original controversy,4 and is proper as long as the
two controversies involve substantial questions of law or fact common
to both,5 the basic historical requirement of "liability over" persists,'
and must be clearly set forth in the third party complaint. 7 Therefore, where a third party complaint against a steel company in an
action by the company's employee against the company's transportation contractor for personal injuries, arising from the contractor's failure to warn such employee of the manner in which the truck was
maintained and loaded, alleged that the contractor had no control over
the loading and unloading operations, and had neither actual nor constructive notice of improper loading, the third party complaint was
held responsible to a co-delinquent for damage paid by reason of the offense in
which both were concerned in different degrees as perpetrators." Then, by logical development, the rule of indemnity was gradually evolved to cover municipalities, property owners, contractors, and sub-contractors. Harrington v. 615 West Corp., supra,note 2.
See, however, Wolf v. La Rosa & Sons, Inc., 298 N. Y. 597, 81 N. E. 2d 329
(1948), for what seems to be a narrow construction of the purpose and function of
§ 193-a of the Civil Practice Act.
4 The old requirement under § 193, subd. 3 of the Civil Practice Act permitting
impleader only upon a showing of definite liability over, as well as identity of claims,
was changed by § 193-a (added L. 1946), Ch. 971, which now allows third-party practice upon a showing that the third-party "may be liable" to the defendant for all or
part of the plaintiff's claim against the impleading defendant. Hence it is now sufficient
if merely one question of law or fact be indicated. Salzberg v. Raynay Holding Corp.,
188 Misc. 1009, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 608 (City Ct. N. Y. 1947).
5 That the third-party complaint alleges facts inconsistent with the original plaintiff's complaint, and which, if true, would absolve the third-party plaintiff of liability
to the original plaintiff, is of no moment, however. Robinson v. Binghamton Construction Company, 277 App. Div. 468, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 900 (3d Dep't 1950).
6 Wolf v. La Rosa & Sons, Inc., note 3, supra.
When the third-party complaint shows upon its face, however, that there is no
basis for a claim of indemnity against the impleaded defendant, it must be dismissed.
Green v. Hudson Shoring Co., Inc., 191 Misc. 297, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 842 (Sup. Ct.
Kings Co. 1947). The same result would follow if the third-party complaint merely spells
out the defense to plaintiff's charges that the defendant was guilty of active negligence. Ingraldi v. Chazen, 207 Misc. 977, 131 N. Y. S. 2d 431 (Sup. Ct. Queens
Co. 1954).
7 Resnick v. City of New York, 286 App. Div. 861, 141 N. Y. S. 2d 802 (2d
Dep't 1955).
It should be noted that the right of the State of New York to implead a
'third-party defendant must await such time as it consents to be sued in a court of
general jurisdiction, such as the New York Supreme Court. Or, in the meantime, the
state may, by separate action, enforce any right of indemnification from third parties
in a court of general jurisdiction, but not in the Court of Claims. Horoch v. State of
New York, 286 App. Div. 303, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 327 (3rd Dep't 1955).
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held to have alleged facts which precluded liability on the part of
the contractor, and was insufficient.'
§ 193-a of the Civil Practice Act provides:
"Third-party practice: courts to which applicable. 1. After the
service of his answer, a defendant may bring in a person not a party
to the action, who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him, by serving as a third-party plaintiff upon
such person a summons and copy of a verified complaint. The claim
against such person, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, must
be related to the main action by a question of law or fact common to
both controversies, but need not rest upon the same cause of action
or the same ground as the claim asserted against the third-party
plaintiff."
In other words, the two controversies to be adjudicated must
have some connection with each other and involve common factual or legal issues, and the third-party defendant must have the obligation of exonerating or reimbursing the original defendant (the thirdparty plaintiff) for all or part of the original plaintiff's recovery
against him. Therefore, a resort to the practice whereby, pursuant
to Section 271 of the Civil Practice Act, a defendant in a action may
set up a counterclaim against the plaintiff along with another party, is
not deemed a third-party complaint within the meaning or purpose of
the impleader statute. 9 Nor may a third-party plaintiff assert an
affirmative claim for his own damages where he is under no legal
liability to the original plaintiff.
It follows, hypothetically, that where a third-party claim is based
upon C's duty to exonerate or reimburse B for all or part of a recovery by A in the main action, that B may implead C irrespective
of whether C is also directly liable to A. Where there is no such
duty, impleader is improper as a matter of law even though C may be
liable to A jointly with B. Thus impleader of a joint tort-feasor, on
the ground that he is liable to the plaintiff jointly with the defendant,
must be denied. Furthermore, a joint tort-feasor who has not been
sued, neither "is" considered liable over, nor "may" he become liable
over, to the original defendant sued in the action, since there can be
no joint money judgment in plaintiff's favor against both joint tortfeasors as required by Section 211-a of the Civil Practice Act. And
even if the plaintiff had commenced action against both joint tort8 Coffey v. Flower City Carting & Excavating Co., Inc., 2 App. Div. 2d 191, 153
N. Y. S. 2d 763 (4th Dep't 1956).
9 Hirsch v. Schiffman, 199 Misc. 883, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 913 (Sup. Ct. King's Co.

1950).
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feasors, one of them would not be permitted to file a cross-claim against
the other, pursuant to Sections 264 and 474 of the Civil Practice Act,
as the right of contribution does not arise, nor is a remedy for its
prosecution given, by Section 211-a until one of the defendants has
paid more than his proportionate share of the judgment. Much less
can there be an impleader of a joint tort-feasor whom the original
plaintiff has not sued.1"
It has been suggested by the Appellate Division, Third Department, however, that:
"If it appears at the trial that the third-party plaintiffs are asserting a severable separate cause of action on their own, the Trial Term
would have discretion to sever, although whether it should at that
stage of the litigation exercise its discretion in this direction when
all parties are present, merely to follow procedural form, we do not
now decide."" This issue would usually, therefore, be raised on the
pleadings, as either the original complaint or the third-party complaint must on its face allege facts from which liability of the thirdparty defendant may be inferred; that is, that the third-party defendant is one who is, or may be, liable to the third-party complainant
for all or part of the complainant's demand over.12 Put otherwise,
the third-party complaint must allege, as a pleading, facts establishing prima facie the complainant's right to indemnification,
This
means, in turn, that it must allege facts which legally establish, or at
least indicate, the primary liability of the third-party defendant, together with the concomitant implication of the third-party plaintiff's
merely passive negligence. 4
10 Gleason v. Sailer, 203 Misc. 227, 116 N. Y. S. 2d 409 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co.
1952; MacGoldberg et al. v. Lieberthal, 203 Misc. 350,
N. Y. S. 2d (Sup. Ct.
Bronx Co. 1951).
11 B. M. C. Manufacturing Corp. v. Tarshis, 278 App. Div. 266, 272, 104 N. Y. S.
2d 254, 259 (3rd Dep't 1951).
12 Resnick v. City of New York, supra, note 7.
Under § 264 Civil Practice Act, a party to an action may claim over as against
any other party, whether plaintiff or defendant, in order to avoid a multiolicity of
suits, and to determine in one action all issues arising out of a given set of circumstances. D'Onofrio v. City of New York, 284 App. Div. 688, 134 N. Y. S. 2d 569 (1st
Dep't 1954).
13 Shass v. Abgold Realty Corp., 277 App. Div. 346, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 121 (2d
Dep't 1950). Although the requirements for pleading a cross claim under section 264
Civil Practice Act are not so stringent as those with respect to a pleading under thirdparty practice, this does not warrant sustaining a cross claim where neither the complaint in the action nor the statement of the cross claim pleads facts from which the
basis of indemnity over may be found or is fairly inferable. Ibid.
14 D'Onofrio v. City of New York, supra note 12. See, however, the strong dis-
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THE ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE DETERMINANT
IN IMPLEADER PROCEDURE
APART from the prima facie showing of liability over, required to
be stated in the complaint of either the original plaintiff or of the
third-party complainant, the actual determination of the issue of active
versus passive negligence in the tort-feasor relation must generally
await the trial of the issues, as this question is usually for the jury.15
Surely, if there is a substantial doubt as to whether a jury might find
the presence of both active and passive negligence in the case, the
doubt should be resolved by the trial court's sustaining the third-party
complaint, to await disposition of the issue at the trial.1 And if the
original complaint sets forth acts of alleged negligence, both active
and passive in character, the third-party complaint should not be dismissed by the court on the pleadings.17
The chief difficulty in the application of these principles to the
modus vivendi of third-party practice has been that the active-passive
negligence concept has been neither sharply delineated in judicial
opinions, nor uniformly applied in substantially similar factual situations. As a learned New York Supreme Court jurist has observed:
II.

"The unanlyzed terminology of 'active' and 'passive' conduct
and of "actual' and 'constructive' notice results, I fear, in beclouding
the crucial issue. The phrasing shows what confusion will arise if we
attempt to fit specific cases into the bare cubicles of easy nomenclature. Confusion made worse confounded is apparent from the fact
that the principal authorities are relied upon with equal vigor by each
antagonist."'' 8
The problem posed by the comparative or relative culpability of
joint tort-feasors .is certainly not resolved simply by a facile declaration of the "active-passive" participation clich6, since the fault of
senting opinion of Froessel, J., in Middleton v. City of New York, 300 N. Y. 732, 92
N. E. 2d 312 (1950).
And indemnity against a principal wrongdoer to one less culpable is allowed although both are equally liable to the injured party. Crawford v. Blitman Construction Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 398, 150 N. Y. S. 2d 387 (1st Dep't 1956).
15 Ruping v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, 283 App. Div. 204, 126
N. Y. S. 2d 687 (3rd Dep't 1953); Cosgrove v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 275 App. Div.
1030, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 392, aff'd 276 App. Div. 842, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 915 (1st Dep't 1949).
16 Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 1 App. Div. 2d 559, 152 N. Y. S. 2d
79 (3rd Dep't 1956).
27 Coffey v. Flower City Carting & Excavating Co., Inc., supra note 8.
18 Matthew M. Levy, Jr., in Falk v. Crystal Hall Inc., 200 Misc. 979, 984, 105
N. Y.. S. 2d 66, 70, aff'd 279 App. Div. 1071, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 277 (1st Dep't 1952).
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omission, as well as the fault of commission, may constitute active
negligence sufficient to bar impleader.19
The sound determinant would seem, therefore, to rest upon the
concept of comparative guilt, as between the one seeking indemnification and the one charged with liability over. The ultima ratio becomeq
a moral or ethical matrix of comparative fault. Within such frame of
reference and responsibility, something left undone, where legal duty
imposes affirmative action, can be tantamount to active negligence;
whereas something done wrongfully or inadequately may spell out
merely passive negligent responsibility for indemnification purposes.
Such interpretation is no stranger to the law, and has found a firm
place in the general application of the doctrine of estoppel as between two comparatively innocent parties, one of whom must suffer
a loss to satisfy a legitimate claim of an injured plaintiff. At least,
the principle seems well established that there can be no recovery over,
between joint tort-feasors in pari delicto in the absence of a clear
agreement of indemnity between them.2
III. CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS IN THE IMPLEADER
CONCEPT
ADDITIONAL objections which might operate to bar the right of recovery over, under third-party practice are: (a) the failure or refusal
of the New York courts to apply or extend the procedure to the doctrine of comparative negligence in highway accident cases 21 (b) the
breach of a statutory duty in a case where violation of the statute is
evidence of negligence per se, thereby depriving the obligor under
the statute of the right of recovery over, even though technically he
was guilty of mere omission of duty, except again, where there 2is2 an unequivocally expressed agreement of indemnity in his favor
19 Ebbe v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 1 N. Y. 2d 846, 153 N. Y. S. 2d 225 (1956);
Burke v. Wegman's Food Markets, Inc., 1 Misc. 2d 130, 146 N. Y. S. 2d 556 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe Co. 1955).
20 Kennedy v. Bethlehem Steel Company, 307 N. Y. 875, 122 N. E. 2d 753 (1954).
See also Burke v. City of New York, 2 N. Y. 2d 90, 138 N. E. 2d 332 (1956).
21 Anderson v. Liberty Fast Freight Co., Inc., supra, note 1.
22 Geterally, statutes such as §§ 240 and 241 New York Labor Law, dealing with
construction and demolition projects, mandate a positive, undelegable duty, the breach
of which entails per se a primary and "active" wrongdoing charge against the noncomplying defendant. Rufo v. Orlando, 309 N. Y. 345, 130 N. E. 2d 887 (1955). Other
statutory provisions, however, such as section 200 of the New York Labor Law do
not preclude inquiry into the question of "active or passive" negligent conduct. Soderman v. Stone Bar Associates, Inc., 208 Misc. 864, 146 N. Y. S. 2d 233 (Sup. Ct.
King's Co. 1955).

MODERN THIRD-PARTY

1957]

PRACTICE

(c) the third-party plaintiff cannot seek impleader where he is under
no legal liability to the original plaintiff, 3 nor can the original plaintiff proceed against the third-party defendant brought into the case
24
if the original defendant is found not liable to the original plaintiff
(d) the right to implead may be lost by proof that the third-party
plaintiff created a dangerous condition which caused the original
plaintiff's injury or damage2 5 (e) by proof that the third-party plaintiff, after discovering the danger created by the party sought
to be impleaded, acquiesced in the continuation thereof. 6
IV.

THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE IN CONTRACTOR
RELATIONS

As APPLIED to contractor relations, the right of a general contractor to indemnity against a sub-contractor on a particular job,
may be waived in either one of the following situations: (a) where
the general contractor assumed control over the sub-contractor's workmen and directed them to proceed under dangerous circumstances2 7
(b) where the general contractor furnished the sub-contractor or his
workmen with a defective appliance and knowingly permitted its use
23 Del Longo v. Bennett-Brewster Co. Inc., 192 Misc. 426, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 901
(Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1948).
24 Sottile v. Rednick, 205 Misc. 83, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 642 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Co.
1953), holding that a tenant in control of a condition causing injury to a plaintiff
cannot be held by such plaintiff if such tenant is not originally brought into the case,
simply because the latter is impleaded as a third-party defendant by the landlord, if
the landlord is held not liable to the plaintiff, e.g., as being out of possession and
control of the premises. Nor can a defendant compel the original plaintiff to join a
third-party defendant in the action even though the proposed third-party defendant
may also be liable to the plaintiff, as that choice is the plaintiff's alone to make.
Sullivan v. O'Ryan, 206 Misc. 212, 132 N. Y. S. 2d 211 (Westchester Co. 1954). This
suggests the danger of allowing judgment to proceed against a party who could have
brought in another as a third-party defendant under § 193-a, as even the innocent
defendant may have to contribute, under section 211-a Civil Practice Act, with the
active tort-feasor. Tron v. Thime, 201 Misc. 85, 90, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 546 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester Co. 1951).
25 Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, supra note 16.
26 It would seem, however, that actual, not merely constructive notice of the dangerous condition on the part of the property owner must be shown to bar his right
of indemnification over against the contractor creating the danger, at least where the
work is delegable, and there is no absolute liability imposed on the owner by statute.
Harrington v. 615 West Corp., supra, note 2.
The statement in Falk v. Crystal Hall, supra note 18, that there is no justifiable
distinction in principle between actual and constructive notice as a differentiating
basis for disallowing or permitting indemnity, must be considered a mere obiter dictum
as the landlord in that case had actual notice of the dangerous condition.
27 Broderick v. Cauldwell Wingate Co., 301 N. Y. 182, 93 N. E. 2d 629 (1950).
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without inspecting it for defects.2 8 But a general contractor is not
obligated to protect employees of a sub-contractor against the negli-

gence of their employer. Nor has a general contractor any duty to inspect machinery or tools furnished by a sub-contractor to the latter's

employees, nor to repair a defective appliance used by a sub-contractor, as the general duty of a contractor to employees of a subcontractor is merely that of assuring them of a safe place to work.2"

It follows, therefore, that where the negligence of a sub-contractor is the
sole cause of his employee's injuries, the employee's exclusive remedy
is under the Workmen's Compensation Law."°
In contract actions, a contractor is allowed to implead the owner
of the premises on which work was performed by a sub-contractor,

because if the latter's work was satisfactory the general contractor
would be liable therefor, and in turn the owner would be liable to the
general contractor. The claim of the contractor against the property
owner, however, cannot exceed the amount claimed against the con-

tractor by the sub-contractor.31 But the contractor's right of impleader may be sacrificed where it violated some statutory provision imputing negligence per se in construction or demolition work, since here
the statutory violation renders the contractor, by legal construction, an
active tort-feasor in pari delito with the sub-contractor who created

the danger, unless there is a clearly phrased agreement of indemnification between them.m
As regards the right of an owner of property under construction

or repair to implead a general contractor on the job, when the owner
28 Dolnick v. Edward Donner Lumber Corporation, 275 App. Div. 954, 89 N. Y.
S. 2d 783 (2d Dep't 1949). It has been held that an inclusive arbitration clause in
a contract may preclude a contractor from impleading a sub-contractor. See, Knolls
Cooperative Section No. 1, Inc. v. Hennessy, 3 Misc. 2d 220, 150 N. Y. S. 2d 713 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx Co. 1956).
29 Gambella v. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 285 App. Div. 580, 140 N. Y. S. 2d 208
(2d Dep't 1955).
It is possible that a general contractor may be liable to an employee of a subcontractor for failure to provide a safe place to work. Nevertheless, the sub-contractor
may also be liable over to the general contractor for failure to inspect allegedly defective material claimed to have caused the accident. Pursuing this further, the sub-contractor may now be entitled to recovery against the supplier of the defective material
as a primary wrongdoer, assuming that the supplier had knowledge of the use and users
of the material. Crawford v. Blitman Construction Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 398, 150
N. Y. S. 2d 387 (1st Dep't 1956).
30 NEW Yoax WORxmEN'S Co3PENSATION LAW, §§ 10, 11.

31 Carroll Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Mechanical Installations, Inc., 201 Misc. 689,

110 N. Y. S. 2d 581 (Sup. Ct. Queen's Co. 1951).
32 Gambella v. Johnson & Sons, supra note 29.
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is sued by one injured or killed on the premises as a result of the
negligence of the contractor, the New York courts have generally
treated such owner as merely a passive tort-feasor where liability is
premised on the sole fact of his ownership right in the property on
which the accident occurred, 31 unless the duty of care in performing
the work is non-delegable, 34 or unless, after his receiving actual notice of the dangerous condition created by the contractor, he acquiesced therein.35 Even an indemnity agreement between an owner and
a contractor purportedly absolving the owner from liability at the
hands of the injured party may prove legally ineffective because of the
invalidating effect of public policy, 6 or statute, 37 or because it is not
sufficiently broad in purpose to effectuate the indemnity coverage intended by the parties.38
33

Tipaldi v. Riverside Memorial Chapel, Inc., 298 N. Y. 686, 82 N. E. 2d 585

(1948).
34 Schwartz v. Merola Bros. Construction Corp., 290 N. Y. 145, 152, 48 N. E. 2d
299 (1943).

An interesting itemization of such non-delegable duties is set forth in Janice v.
State of New York, 201 Misc. 915, 919-922, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 674, 678-680 (Ct. Claims
1951):
(1) Where the work in the natural course of events will produce injury unless
certain precautions are taken;
(2) Where the work contracted to be done is inherently or intrinsically dangerous;
(3) Where the employment of an independent contractor is for work likely to
render the premises dangerous to invitees;
(4) Where the owner fails to use reasonable care to select a competent contractor.
35 Harrington v. 615 West Corp., supra, note 2.
See, also, Stabile v. Vitullo, 280 App. Div. 191, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 693 (4th Dep't 1952),
where the agreement of the third-party defendant to repair damage to stairs caused
by its employees did not relieve the third-party plaintiffs, as owners of the property,
of their duty to the public to correct the defect of which they had actual notice.
And a breached agreement to carry insurance to save the contractor harmless may
further curtail the prolerty owner's right of recovery over which right would other-wise have existed. Gorham v. Arons, 282 App. Div. 147, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 669 (1st
Dep't 1953), rearg. denied, 282 App. Div. 760, 122 N. Y. S. 2d 892 (1st Dep't 1953),
aff'd 306 N. Y. 782, 118 N. E. 2d 600 (1954).
36 Rufo v. Orlando, supra, note 22.
An agreement of indemnity must be set forth in the third-party complaint. A
mere allegation that there is a contract of indemnification is insufficient. Verder v.
Schack, 191 Misc. 935, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 700 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1948).
37 Where liability of a landowner or contractor exists, it cannot be circumvented
by the terms of any agreement for the construction, repair, or maintenance of real
estate. NEw YoRx REAL PRoPERTY LAW, § 235.
38 Broderick v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., Inc., 305 N. Y. 872, 93 N. E. 2d 629 (1953),
action by general contractor against sub-contractor.
Good Neighbor Federation v. Pathe Industries, Inc., 202 Misc. 951, 114 N. Y. S. 2d
365 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1952), aff'd 281 App. Div. 968, 120 N. Y. S. 2d 925 (1953),
where the contract was construed to indemnify the owner against thd negligent acts
of the -contractor, and not for the owner's own negligence.
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It is, therefore, not the mere fact of property ownership which,
strictly speaking, bars an owner from the right of recovery over, but
rather, as a general rule,39 his ownership as coupled with the incidents
of occupation and control of the premises on which the plaintiff's injuries occurred. 40 This entails the further connotation of the right of
the owner not merely to enter the property for the purpose of making
repairs at the tenant's request, nor even of an agreement by him to
make repairs, 41 but rather, as the Court of Appeals has recently held,
it means the practice and procedure of retaining a general supervision
over the premises.4 2 On the other hand, apart from the provisions of
a lease, a lessee may be held liable to the lessor, within the general
principle of indemnity in tort actions, for any liability to which the
lessor might be subjected by reason of the lessee's breach of its primary obligation to exercise care and to comply with all relevant
statutes while the lessee is in occupation of the premises. 48 This obligation to indemnify the lessor is not, it has been held, satisfied or discharged in advance by the lessee's procurement of public liability insurance under a specific requirement of the lease, as such procurement, not being voluntary on the lessee's part, does not immunize the
lessee from liability for its own wrongdoing.44
V. THE POSITION OF AN INSURANCE COMPANY
IN THIRD-PARTY ACTIONS
IN

REFEPENCE

company
the issue
contract,
prejudice

to the right of an insured to implead the insurance

in an action against the insured by an aggrieved plaintiff,
would seem to depend first, upon the terms of the insurance
and second, upon the fact as to whether impleader would
the company. Usually there is no sound reason why the

89 That is, putting aside decisions dealing with the duty of care owed
landlord out of possession to one on property to which members of the general
are admitted; or the duty to a passerby on a public street; or in respect to a
way adjoining the leased premises. See, Appel v. Muller, 262 N. Y. 278, 186

by a
public
public
N. E.

785 (1933).
40

Wischnie v. Dorsch, 296 N. Y. 257, 72 N. E. 2d 700 (1947).

41 Dick v. Sunbright Steam Laundry Corp., 307 N. Y. 422, 121 N. E. 2d 399 (1954).
42 De"Clara v. Barber Steamship Lines, Inc., 309 N. Y. 620, 132 N. E. 2d 871

(1956), holding that a landlord may retain the essential element of control of leased
premises by reserving to himself the right, to be exercised in his independent discretion,
to enter the premises at any time to make repairs on his own responsibility, even
though the primary duty of repair may rest on the tenant.
43 Merkle v. 110 Glen Street Realfy Corp., 282 App. Div. 617, 125 N. Y. S. 2d
881 (3rd Dep't 1953).
44 Id. at 620, 621.
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right of an insured to indemnity from an insurer cannot be determined at the same time as the original claim by the plaintiff against
the insured is decided,45 provided the insurer is protected against the
possibility that judgment against the insurer may be rendered prior
to judgment on the issue against the insurbd.40 Where the action will
be tried by a jury, however, it has been held that the third-party
defendant insurance company is entitled to an order of severance, as
the fact of insurance coverage should not be brought to the attention
of the jury to whom will be submitted the issues between the original
plaintiff and the insured." Notwithstanding the general rule, however,
that in negligence cases the admission of evidence before a jury
that a defendant carries insurance constitutes reversible error,48 the
Appellate Division of the Second Department has permitted the impleader of the disclaiming insurance carrier despite this objection.4 9
Likewise, the Appellate Division of the Second and Third Departments
have allowed impleader of the insurance company despite a provision
in the insurance contract to the effect that "no action shall lie against
the company until the amount of the insured's obligation shall have
been finally determined either by judgment against the insured after
trial, or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant, and the insurance company."5 Although this latter determination appears not
45 Caserta v. Beaver Construction Corp., 197 Misc. 410, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 131 (Sup.
Ct. Queen's Co. 1949).
46 Judy Negligee, Inc. v. Portnoy, 194 Misc. 508, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 656 (City Ct.
N. Y. Co. 1949).
47 Caserta v. Beaver Construction Corp., supra, note 45.
48 Simpson v. Foundation Co., 201 N. Y. 479, 95 N. E. 10 (1911); Morton v.
Maryland Casualty Company, 1 App. Div. 2d 116, 148 N. Y. S. 2d 524 (2d Dep't
1955).
49 Adelman Mfrs. Corp. v. New York Wood Finisher's Supply Co., 277 App. Div.
1117, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 867 (2d Dep't 1950); Brooklyn Yarn Dye Co. v. Empire State
Warehouses Corp., 276 App. Div. 611, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 738 (2d Dep't 1950), motion
for leave to appeal denied, 277 App. Div. 796, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 552 (2d Dep't 1950).
An examination of the records on appeal of both these cases fails to reveal, however, that the question of prejudice was raised. See, Gleason v. Sailer, 203 Misc. 227,
116 N. Y. S. 2d 409 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1952).
50 Brooklyn Yarn Dye Co. v. Empire State Warehouses Corp., note 49, supra;

Lecouna Cuban Boys Ipc. v. Kiamesha Concord Inc., 276 App. Div. 808, 93 N. Y. S.
2d 113 (3rd Dep't 1949), motion for leave to appeal denied, 276 App. Div. 940, 94
N. Y. S. 2d 202, app. dism. 300 N. Y. 740, 92 N. E. 2d 317 (1950).
It would seem, however, that where the insurance policy in so many words specifically negatives the right to join the company as a co-defendant in any action against
the insured to determine the insured's liability, it successfully prevents the use of impleader between the insured and the insurer, since section 193-a, being procedural in
nature and not involving fundamental public policy, may be waived by agreement.
Aulisio v. California Oil Company, 202 Misc. 1050, 120 N. Y. S. 2d 582 (Sup. Ct.
Ulster Co. 1952).
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to have been passed upon by the Court of Appeals, or by the Appellate Division of the First Department, the Supreme Court of New
York County has recently followed the ruling of the Second and Third
Departments, suggesting however, that the device of a declaratory
judgment might be preferable to impleader against the insurance carrier to establish the legal rights of the insured and the insurer under
51
the policy.
The case law in New York pertaining to the right of an insurance
company to implead a third-party defendant in an action upon the
policy is rather meager. Ordinarily, an insurer possesses no right of
subrogation against a party causing the insured's loss until the insurer
has paid the loss under the policy.52 Where, however, the claim over
is based on negligence rather than on contract, it has been decided
that a third-party complaint by an insurance company is sufficient under
Section 193-a although no payment has been made by the company
to its insured. 3 In the case last referred to, the owner of certain
premises sued the defendant insurer for a fire loss. The defendant in
its answer was permitted to bring in as a third-party defendant a subcontractor whose electrical installation work was claimed by the insurance company to have been negligently performed, thereby causing the loss to the insured. Where, however, there is no claim in negligence by the insurer against a primary wrongdoer, and where the
alleged liability over is based strictly on the insurance contract, impleader would probably be denied.
VI. EXAMINATION BEFORE TRIAL POSSIBILITIES
IN IMPLEADER PRACTICE
is considerable difference of opinion among the New York
courts as to whether a defendant should be permitted to examine a
THERE

51 Kahn v. George F. Driscoll Company et al., 1 Misc. 2d 405, 146 N. Y. S. 2d
902 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1955).
See, however, Chizik v. Fuchs, 193 Misc. 297, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 437 (N. Y. Co.
1947), an eight year earlier case, denying the right of impleader in a negligence action
against a non-defending insurance company on its contractual liability to the insured,
on the ground that the merger of the contract with the tort issue would necessarily
prejudice the company. Such construction seems narrow in the light of the more recent
decisions.
52 Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp. v. Hooker Electrochem Co., 240 N. Y. 37,
147 N. E. 351 (1925).
53 Madison Ave. Properties Corp. v. Royal Insurance Co., 281 App. Div. 641,
120 N. Y. S. 2d 626 (1953). This case, however, has been considered a very advanced
construction of the impleader procedure. See, Prashker, New York Practice 284, § 163A,
note 16 (3d ed., Brooklyn 1948).
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co-defendant before trial to determine the circumstances of the case.
Those decisions denying the right rest upon the broad argument that
the defendant seeking the examination does not have the affirmative
of any of the issues in the action.54 More recent cases, however, decided since the enactment of Rule 121-a of New York Civil Practice
(July 1952), have allowed such examination even in the absence of a
cross complaint. 55 This rule provides:
"In any action, at any time after the service of an answer, any
party may cause to be taken by deposition before trial, the testimony
of any other party, his agent or employee as prescribed by sections
288 and 289 of -the Civil Practice Act, regardless of the burden of
proof."
In line with the increased liberality and encouragement of pretrial examinations throughout the state in negligence actions,"8 and in
modern recognition of the fact that all surrounding circumstances of
an accident are just as material and necessary to a defendant as they
are to a plaintiff in a negligence case, such examination before trial
of a co-defendant should now no longer be withheld. Thus, a defendant should be allowed also to examine before trial another defendant
who, although not an original party to the action, is nonetheless
brought into the case by impleader as a third-party, within the general
purpose of Rule 121-a which permits any party, after the service of
an answer, to cause to be taken by deposition before trial the testimony of any other party.5 7
VII.

THE EFFECT OF THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE
UPON SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS

AN INTERESTING question, raised by the possibility of impleader
against a passive wrongdoer, is whether a defendant may be brought
into an action under Section 193-a when such defendant has a valid de54 Johansen v. Gray, 279 App. Div. 108, 108 N. Y. S. 2d 35 (1951), where the
Appellate Division, Second Department denied such examination on the added ground
that in the absence of any issues between the defendants, the examination was not
material and necessary under § 288 CivL PRACTCE Act.
5 Fenwick v. Kappler, 205 Misc. 594, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 55 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Co.
1954); Powers v. Marrone, 206 Misc. 173, 133 N. Y. S. 2d 110 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co.

1954).
56 See, Bronx County Supreme Court Rules for Trial and Special Terms, Rule XIX;
New York County Supreme Court Rules for Trial Terms, Rule X; RrFLEs Crvm PR.ACTiCE,

Rule 121-a and CIvI

PRACICE

AcT, section 292-a.

57 See, Frost v. Walsh, 195 Misc. 390, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 292 (Ct. of Claims Rensselaer Co. 1949), aff'd 275 App. Div. 1017, 91 N. Y. S. 2d 746 (3rd Dep't 1949).
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fense against the claim of the original plaintiff. To allow such procedure
would often have the effect of rendering such defendant ultimately
liable for a claim which the law permits him successfully to resist.
Yet, both modern adjudication and statutory law have clearly sanctioned such possibility. In Schomber v. Tait, 8 decided by the Supreme
Court of Westchester County in 1955, an action was brought againit
the owner of an automobile which was driven by plaintiff's father,
on the ground of the father's negligent operation of the car, causing
injuries to the infant plaintiff who was a passenger in the car. The
New York law is well settled that an unemancipated child may not
maintain an action for a non-willful personal injury against his
parent. 9 On the other hand, the owner of a motor vehicle is responsible under the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law for the negligent
operation of the vehicle by one using the car with the express or implied permission of the owner. 60 The issue raised, therefore, was
whether the owner of the car could be held vicariously responsible
for the driver's negligence if no cause of action lay against the operator because of the parental relation. Held, that the plaintiff's inability to sue his father was premised upon a purely personal defense,
and not upon the fact that the father was not inherently negligent.
The personal relationship does not absolve the father of his wrongful
conduct. Therefore, the car owner, to whom the law imputes such
wrongful negligent conduct, must answer for plaintiff's damages.
A case of this type immediately suggests the question, can the
owner implead the driver as a third-party defendant? The Court of
Appeals in 1955, in the case of Traub v. Dinzler,61 decided that where
liability is predicated upon the ownership of a motor vehicle under
Section 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, and where the negligence of
the owner is merely passive, that such owner is entitled to recover over,
against the actively negligent driver. And in the recent case of Lanser
v. Baumrin,62 the New York Appellate Term, Second Department
58 207 Misc. 328, 140 N. Y. S. 2d 746 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 1955).
N Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N. Y. 425, 40 N. E. 2d 236 (1942); Sorrentino v.
Sorrentino, 248 N. Y. 626, 162 N. E. 551 (1928).
Where a parent is accused on proper factual allegations of operating a car "will-

fully, wantonly and culpably", however, thereby causing injury to the plaintiff infant.
the complaint states a good cause of action. Siembab v. Siembab, 284 App. Div. 652,
134 N. Y. S. 2d 437 (4th Dep't 1954).
60 § 59, New York Vehicle and Traffic Law.
61 309 N. Y. 395, 131 N. E. 2d 564 (1955).
62 2 Misc. 2d 610, 151 N. Y. S. 2d 466 (2d Dep't 1956).
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held, that in an automobile negligence action, a cross complaint of a
defendant owner of the vehicle for judgment, declaring that if such
defendant is held liable to plaintiff's passenger, then the plaintiff
operator must indemnify such owner, is not barred by the statute of
limitations as a cause of action for indemnity does not accrue until
actual payment of the main claim, whether such payment be made
voluntarily or pursuant to court judgment. These principles were
held to apply irrespective of whether indemnity be sought under
Sections 193-a or 264 of the Civil Practice Act, as both are intended to
accomplish the same purpose under different circumstances, although
with somewhat different pleading and procedural requirements.
Hence, returning to the Schomber case, it would seem to follow
that if the car owner had not been in the car, (the fact was brought
out in the decision that the owner was present in the car at the time
of the accident and retained dominion over it), and had not retained
the right to control its operation, his cause today for impleader against
the driver, plaintiff's father, would have been established under the
rationale of the Traub case. Such result would, as a consequence, render the third-party defendant liable for indemnification to the thirdparty plaintiff" for a liability which the original plaintiff (the infant)
could not charge against the third-party defendant (the parent) by
direct suit because of the latter's personal disability.6 3
An analogous situation in which a party may ultimately have to
respond in damages through third-party practice for injuries to a
plaintiff whose direct action against such party is barred by legal
defense, is found in such cases as Goldwasserv. Raniere, 4 and Schaller
v. Republic Aviation Corporation,65 in which latter case it was held that
in a personal injury action a defendant may implead the plaintiff's
employer as an indemnitor even though the result may render the
latter indirectly liable for damages for injuries to an employee for
which there could be no direct recovery because of the employer's
compliance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law. 66
63 Although the court in the Schomber case considered the evidence that the owner
was in the car at the time of plaintiff's injury, it does not appear from any facts in
the decision what the owner did, or failed to do, for the court to have concluded that
the owner retained dominion over the vehicle, and that he had the legal right to control its operation. At any rate, the court proceeds to point out that the failure of the
owner to control the operation of the car would not change his rights nor limit his

liability.

64 2 Misc. 2d 606, 151 N. Y. S. 2d 170 (App. Term, 1st Dep't 1956).
65 193 Misc. 60, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 540 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 1948).
66 Another interesting example of the same general principle is found in the recent
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CONCLUSION
despite the general judicial observation that the impleader statute is only procedural in nature, and that the substantial rights
of the parties to third-party practice are not changed, cases such
as the above would suggest that a third-party defendant's rights may
be materially affected by impleader, and that often very vital personal interests depend upon the contingency of whether a party is
brought into an action through this method.
HENCE,

case of Jacobs v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 2 Misc. 2d 428, 152
N. Y. S. 2d 128 (N. Y. Co. 1956), where it was held that a husband may be indirectly

responsible to answer for damages to his wife, even though he was not sued, and that
his insurance policy did not cover her because of statutory disability.

